Les grisen.

ESSAYS, PAPERS AND PROJECTS: (in chronological order)




?On The Incarnation of God, Or, On The Hypostatic Union (1669 - 1670(?))
?Trinity. Mind. (spring - autumn 1671)
?The Philosopher's Confession (autumn 1672 -
winter 1672/3?)
?The Author Of Sin (1673?)
?On Polygamy (4 Oct. 1675)
?Notes On Henry More's Enchiridion Ethicum (spring - summer 1676?)
?Notes On Metaphysics (Dec. 1676)
?Cartesianism, The Antechamber Of The True Philosophy (1677?)
?Demonstration That God Understands All Possibles (1677?)
?Existence (1677?)
?On The Necessity Of Choosing The Best (1677?)
?On The Obligation To Believe (1st half of 1677?)
?On Purgatory (Jan. 1677)
?Notes On Henry More's The Immortality Of The Soul (Jan. 1677 - Jan. 1678?)
?The Distinction Of Mind And Body (early 1677 - early 1678?)
?Inoppotune Reflections On Human Misery (1677-1716?)
?How The Soul Acts On The Body (early 1677 - early 1678?)
?On Distinct Perception (Oct. 1677 - Dec. 1678 (?))
?On The Host (Oct. 1677)
?Proof Of A Necessary Being (Jan. 1678)
?Aphorisms Concerning Happiness, Wisdom, Charity And Justice (summer - winter 1678/9)
?There Is Only A Single God (1678 - 1686?)
?Dialogue Between A Theologian And A Misosophist (1st half 1678 - 1st half 1679?)
?Analysis Of Abbé Lanion's Meditations On Metaphysics (summer 1678 - winter 1680/1681?)
?On Natural Law (summer 1678 - winter 1680/1)
?On An Instrument Or Great Art Of Thinking (March - April 1679 (?))
?Dialogue Between Theophile
And Polidore (summer - autumn 1679?)
?On Public Happiness (1680?)
?On Freedom And Grace (summer 1680 - summer 1684?)
?On Necessity And Contingency (summer 1680 - summer 1684?)
?On Consciousness And Memory (1683-5(?))
?On The Animal's Soul (1683 - 1685?)
?God Is Not The Soul Of The World (summer 1683 - winter 1685/1686?)
?Pleasure. An Observation Against Descartes (summer 1683 - winter 1685/1686?)
?Notes On Malebranche's Treatise On Nature And Grace (May 1684 - end 1684?)
?Definitions (1685-1696?)
?On The Trinity (autumn 1685 (?))
?Theological Propositions
(autumn 1685 - spring 1686 (?))
?Suppositions (autumn 1685 - spring 1686 (?)) ***
?On Rejecting The Particular Will Of God (winter 1685/1686 (?))
?A Vindication Of Divine Justice And Human Freedom (early 1686?)
?On The General Relation Of All Things (Apr. - Oct. 1686 (?))
?On The Last Things (Apr. -
Oct. 1686 (?))
?On Symbols And The Characteristic Art (summer 1688 (?))
?Body Is Not A Substance (Mar. 1689 - Mar. 1690 (?))
?If A Necessary Being Is Possible, It Follows That It Exists (Mar. 1689 - Mar. 1690 (?))
?On The Cessation Of Distinct Thoughts Without The Extinction Of The Soul (Mar. 1689 - Mar. 1690 (?))
?On The System Of Occasional Causes (Mar. 1689 - Mar. 1690 (?))
?The Origin Of Contingent Truths (summer 1689?)
?Notes On Isaac Papin's The Vanity Of The Sciences (after 1690?)
?Protogaea §§1, 2, 6, 13, 14, 20, 25, 26, 35 & 39 (1690-91)
?On Mary Stuart And Popess Joan (not before 1693)
?On The Ignorant And The
Able (c. 1694)
?On Reason And Divination (1694-97?)
?On Man, Beatitude, God And Christ (1694-1696?)
?On Progress To Infinity (c. 1694-1696)
?Notes On William Penn (1695)
?On The Certainty Of Salvation (17/27 Mar. 1695)
?Double Infinity In Pascal And Monad (after 1695?)
?Theodicaea (1695-97)
?On The Time Of Purification (not later than spring 1698)
?Reflections on Locke's Second Reply (end(?) 1699 - early 1700)
?Demonstrations Concerning The Immense And Eternal Universe (1701)
?Notes on Pierre Bayle's Dictionary, article 'Origen' (1702)
?Notes on Pierre Bayle's Dictionary, article
'Paulicians' (1702)
?Explanation Of Binary Arithmetic (1703)
?Notes On Isaac Jacquelot's The Conformity Of Faith With Reason (early 1704?)
?Notes And Comments On Stephen Nye's The System Of Grace And Free-Will (27 Mar. 1705)
?Note On The Rocks Which Contain Dried Out Plants And Fish (1706)
?On A Talking Dog (1706)
?Draft Preface To The Theodicy (early 1707?)
?Preface To Soner's Book On Hell (1708)
?Revolution (1715)








LEIBNIZ: ON THE INCARNATION
OF GOD, OR, ON THE HYPOSTATIC UNION

[A VI 1, p532]

It is noteworthy that heretics were only considered - even by the ancients - to be those who were subjects. Hence law 12, chapter on heretics - the Goths are excused the punishments laid down for heretics because they are
not subjects but allies [foederati].1 Therefore the crime of heresy is a kind of civil disobedience, and heretics were considered to be those who did not obey the magistracy when it expounded on religion. This law 12 deserves a special practice.2

[A VI 1, p533]

These are able to be
hypostatically united: 1) God and mind, 2) Mind and body, 3) Body and body through a common mind. Body and body cannot be hypostatically united in themselves because no body subsists in itself. Mind and mind cannot be hypostatically united unless one is perfect and the other imperfect, because an imperfect mind does not act outside of
itself except through body. From which it follows that demons are not hypostatically united to the souls of the possessed because they act on those souls through intermediate bodies, and are not hypostatically united to them. Moreover, a created - and hence imperfect - mind is not united to every body, but only to the one in which it is rooted and
from which it cannot be separated. In the human body, for example, it should not be thought that the soul is hypostatically united to all the corpuscles in it since they are constantly in passage; instead, the soul inheres in the very centre of the brain, to a certain fixed and inseparable flower of substance which is most subtly mobile in the centre
of the animal spirits, and it is substantially united so that it is not separated even by death. Therefore the bodies of the possessed are not united to the demon, because their bodies are not inseparably united to it; instead it acts on them only by means of its own body. It now needs to be investigated whether God is hypostatically united to all bodies, that is, to the
whole world, or whether he can be to some bodies or to none. And I think that the world, i.e. bodies, is not hypostatically united to God, because there is no hypostatic union of anything except by means of one thing's action on another, yet God is unable to act on bodies in any other way (annihilation and creation excepted) than by impressing motion.
Moreover, for as long as bodies are moved, they are continually created, as I have demonstrated. Therefore they are united to God for more than an instant, but just as that which does not remain in a place for more than an instant is not considered to be at rest in it but only passes through it, so bodies not united to God for more than an instant
are not properly united but are only in transition. It is otherwise in minds which are not created, for as long as God acts on them, nor is any demonstration for this matter evident, but minds are free and have a principle of activity in themselves, with the exception of that mind whose principle of activity is God, i.e. the one which is united to God. But how,
then, are bodies hypostatically united to minds, since they are only actually united by motion yet do not continuously exist in motion?3 For that reason, then, should it rather be said that bodies are not hypostatically united to God, because he does not act on them in an extraordinary way but is united to all things equally? - on the contrary,
even though he cannot act on bodies in an extraordinary way. Because every action of his on bodies is creation, then although in one way he creates, in another way he does not. He does nothing outside the ordinary in this matter,4 for every extraordinary action of God is extraordinary not by reason of the act, but by reason of the time and
place, for example, because he annihilates a body from a time and a place in which [A VI 1, p534] he is otherwise unaccustomed to annihilate one, namely from a time and a place in which it is at rest, or when he creates a body at a time he does not usually create one, for example when it did not pre-exist beforehand. Or when he creates a body where he is
not accustomed to create one, for example, in a place very far removed from many intervening spaces. Therefore it is not God's action on bodies which is extraordinary and special, but the time of the action. But God's action on a mind is special and as it were determined to this mind even by reason of the act. For God is not accustomed to be the internal
principle of acting, and therefore to act on minds in this way, except on that one alone which he has hypostatically united. Therefore let there be a hypostatic union in those things of which one constantly acts on the other by a special manner of action, that is, of which one is the other's immediate instrument of acting.5 For it is possible
to find here the distinction between the mind's action on the body, and God's action on the body. The mind does not act on the body by creating, but by moving; God creates. Conversely, God acts on bodies only by creating. Moreover, whoever creates, acts on the thing, and does not act by means of the thing, and so the thing is not his instrument of
acting. In truth, the instrument of God is the mind, united to God, and by means of which God acts on bodies otherwise than by creating. The "hypostatically united" is therefore nothing other than what is the immediate instrument of a thing having a principle of action in itself. And hypostatic union is the action of a thing which has
in itself a principle of acting immediately through another thing. And these are the requisites for hypostatic union: 1) A thing subsisting through itself, i.e. having in itself a principle of acting, to which it is united. 2) Some other thing which is united. 3) The action of the subsisting thing through the united thing on a third thing,
that is, so that the united thing is an instrument of the subsisting thing. 4) The immediacy of its action, that is, that it does not act through another thing to which the same thing on which it acts, and which is said to be united to the first thing, is not united. For the united of the united is the united of the first thing. Where A is the
uniting thing, and B that which is said to be united: 1) A is a thing subsisting through itself, 2) A acts on C through B, 3) A acts immediately on B, that is, not through another thing. But, you will say, against the third rule, is not the body of Christ united to the Deity? Yes of course, but it is united to the Deity not immediately, but through mind, so I say that
here A is not the Deity alone, but the Deity together with everything which is united to it, or, which is the same thing, the third rule may be conceived here as follows: A acts on B only through that on which A immediately acts, or through another thing on which it immediately acts. That is, A does not act on B except either immediately or
of motion. Therefore there will be no union except through the impression of motion. On the one hand there is no thought without a union, because to make itself thought is the action of one thing on another, and on the other hand, every action is not between united things by definition of a union. For a union is not contiguity, but continuity, i.e. A
common motion or action. Therefore when created things are at rest, God will know nothing about them. I say in response that he will know that they are at rest because, negatively, he would know if they were moved (and yet this process of reasoning does not occur in God, although he has negative knowledge of a thing negative by itself). And
similarly with the mind. And there is some thought without a union, namely that which existed at the time of the union, i.e. a thought preceding it, and this is an actual rule: without a union there is no thought, namely a new thought, although the old thought remains. Besides, nothing new happens to resting bodies (except that others approach them and
move away from them, which is known from their union and motion, and at that time there is a thought composed from an old and new thought). But in truth, you will say, many things happen in a mind without motion, so how will God know them, since he does not act on the actual mind through itself. The answer is that the mind is indeed not moved, but that all of
its actions are accompanied by a motion of the bodies to which it is united and from which God will know its actions; demons will not know them, because they do not act on those bodies but through bodies, and therefore they do not enter into the interior bodies but only the surface of the corpuscles of minds. At any rate, God foreknows and thinks of all things at
once, because nothing happens against his will, therefore nothing happens with him knowing it too. He knows what he is going to do, therefore he knows what the future must be. And yet there is no process of reasoning in him, which should sometime be explained more carefully.
The question is how a mind which is implanted in the point of a body in
dissipating motion does not perish too. Should it be said that points do not perish because they are not parts of bodies but limits, and because that demonstration about bodies is invalid with regard to points? For at any instant whatsoever a point is present in a certain point of space, but that which exists in a body besides points is sometimes not in
any place and therefore at that time is nothing. Amazing. But few people - only the most subtle - will grasp these secrets of things.
It is notable that the doctrine of the Socinians is far more dangerous than that of the Catholics. For the Catholic Church worships only one God, and worships him only because he is supreme. Even though
it recognizes in him a threefold way of subsisting, it neither divides or multiplies God in this way. Conversely, the Socinians worship a being which they hold to be created, which they do not reckon to be the supreme God, and whom they think has an essence distinct from the supreme God. Therefore they have two Gods. They worship a mere
man, while we worship God inhabiting a man.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


NOTES:

1. Leibniz is referring here to Justianian's Codex
or Corpus jurus civilis: "Considering that we often reckon the Goths our devoted allies to whom neither nature nor their past life has given such minds [as to be to orthodox], we have decided to relax, to a certain extent, the severity [of the laws] in their regard, and permit them to be our allies and to be decorated with honors, to the extent
that those things seem good to us." Corpus juris civilis [Body of civil law]. I.5.12, para. 17.
2. practice. With regard to the incarnation of the son of GOD, or the hypostatic union, these things should be noted. For a hypostatic union it is a requirement that there are similar natures. deleted.
3. motion? Because for that reason they are
inseparable. And it should be noted that there is as it were a disjunctive requirement for hypostatic union, for it requires either inseparability deleted.
4. Marginal note: And here all miracles in bodies, the nature of which is known by very few, are dispelled. NB. Angels cannot stir or stop a body except in another way. All miracles
in bodies consist in creating them, annihilating them, stopping or stimulating their motion, moving them in an instant, or deflecting them from their ordinary path. Angels and men cannot do all these things, for they disturb an object on its ordinary path by means of another body. Minds, though, can move, stop and deflect the bodies which are united to them.
5. Marginal note: We can also respond like this: only a point is substantially, i.e. hypostatically united to a mind, and that point is not annihilated in motion. In moving a thing, however, God, does not act on points, as minds do, but on the body. Add at the end: amazing.
6. Marginal note: NB. A wonderful and notable
specimen of the definition of the analogous, whereby the genus cannot be defined except by a mention made of one principal species, and everything else by means of that.


LEIBNIZ: TRINITY. MIND.

[Gr p559] [A VI 2 p287]
GOD. MIND. Understanding, Power

BODY. WORLD.
Space
Figure
Motion
[SOUL] MIND. GOD.
Understanding
Imagination
Will. Power.

Being
Knowing
Act or endeavour


Just as God would survive if creatures were destroyed, so Mind survives when the body is destroyed. And as God thinks things that he does not perceive by any sense, because they follow from his own nature, so [A VI 2 p288] does Mind. As Mind, thinking about action and existing things,
has understanding and will or disposition, so God has the word and love. If however God did not think himself to be in act, he would certainly think, but would neither perceive nor have happiness.
As it cannot be otherwise than that God thinks himself to be in act, so it cannot be otherwise than that Mind thinks itself to be in act.
Mind and God do not differ except that one is finite and the other infinite.

LEIBNIZ: THE PHILOSOPHER'S CONFESSION

[Bel p24] [A VI 3, p116]

THE THEOLOGIAN AS CATECHIST - Not long ago we spoke adequately, and more than adequately, about the immortality of the mind and
the necessity of the Governor in the world. If you continue to satisfy me in such a way you will greatly lessen my task of instructing you. Today let us address the thorny matter of God's justice, for there is nothing more frequently or speciously opposed to providence than the disorder of things. I would like you to prepare this matter with the
assistance of right reason, and polish it, as it were, so that when I bring the light of the revelations to it, souls should be struck by a purer reflection of their rays.

THE PHILOSOPHER AS CATECHUMEN - The condition pleases me, and it will be fruitful to both sides. But you begin the questioning.
THEOLOGIAN - Then let us seize the heart of the matter: do you believe that God is just?

PHILOSOPHER - Yes I believe it, in fact I know it.

TH - What do you call 'God'?

PH - A substance that is omniscient and omnipotent
TH - And what is it 'to be just'?

PH - Just is he who loves everybody.

TH - But what is to love?

PH - To be delighted by the happiness of another.

TH - What is it to be delighted?
[Bel p26]

PH - To experience harmony.

TH - Finally, what is harmony?

PH - Similarity in variety, i.e., diversity compensated by identity.

TH - Assuming your definition, it seems
necessary that God, if he is just, loves everybody.

PH - Yes, certainly.

TH - But you know that many people have denied this?

PH - It is denied by some great men, but also sometimes affirmed by the same men using a different meaning of words.
TH - We shall talk about this next, perhaps; for now I am eager to see what argument you will use.

PH - It will be taken from the responses given by us both. Is it not conceded that God is omniscient?

TH - What of it?

PH - Therefore there will be no harmony in any
conceivable thing without him continually knowing of it.

TH - That is so.

PH - Moreover, all happiness is harmonic or beautiful?

TH - I agree.

PH - I shall prove this so that others cannot deny it.
Happiness does not exist except in minds?

TH - Correct, for no one is happy unless he knows himself to be so (You know the following: O fortunatos nimium, bona si sua norint!)1 Whatever is aware of its own state is a mind. Therefore nobody is happy unless he is a mind.

PH - Well concluded. But
happiness is evidently a state of mind most pleasing to the mind itself, but nothing is pleasing to the mind besides harmony.

TH - Doubtless that is so, since only a little earlier we agreed that to be delighted is nothing more than to experience harmony.

PH - Happiness will therefore consist of a
state of mind which is as [Bel p28] harmonic as possible. The nature of the mind is to think. Therefore, the harmony of the mind will consist in thinking about [A VI 3, p117] harmony, and the greatest harmony of the mind, or happiness, will consist in concentration of universal harmony, i.e. of God, in the mind.
TH - Splendid! For it is proved at the same time that happiness of the mind and the contemplation of God are the same.

PH - I have therefore proved what I supposed, that all happiness is harmonic.

TH - Now it is time for you to finish your proof, that
God loves everybody.

PH - Consider it done. If all happiness is harmonic (as demonstrated), and all harmony is known to God (by the definition of God), and all experience of harmony is a delight (by the definition of delight), the consequence is that all happiness is pleasing to God. Therefore (by the definition of love assumed
a little earlier) God loves everybody, and hence (by the definition of just put forward) God is just.

TH - The proof lacks very little, and I say you have demonstrated it. And certainly I believe that no one, even those who have denied universal grace, will say otherwise, provided they have understood the words the
way you used them, which did not differ from their ordinary usage.

PH - This, I think, can be deduced from their own opinion. For when they say that God only loves the elect, they show sufficiently that he loved some before others (for that is to elect), and hence since they cannot all be saved (by reason of the
universal harmony of things, just as a painting is distinguished by shades, and concord by dissonance), there are some less loved, who have been rejected, not in fact by God willing it (for God does not will the death of the sinner), but by him permitting it when the nature of things required it. Consequently, when it is said that God loved one and hated another
the sense is that he loved the latter less and hence rejected him since not all can be among the elect. However just as a 'lesser good' sometimes assumes the way of evil, so in the clash of two loves the 'lesser love' can be said [Bel p30] to assume the way of hatred, though such speech is less regular. But this is not the place to determine why God loves one
before the other.

TH - On the contrary, it is from here in fact that the chief difficulties originate, so consider how you could solve them with the same good fortune.

PH - What are the difficulties?

TH - Take the important ones. If God is delighted
by the happiness of everybody, why has he not made everybody happy? If he loves everybody, how is it he damns so many? If he is just, how is it he shows himself to be so unfair that from the matter by which all are equal, from the same clay, he fashions some vessels for honour and others for dishonour?2 And how is he not the patron of sin if, knowing about it
(since he could eliminate it from the world), he admitted or tolerated it? Indeed, how is he not the author of sin if he created everything in such a way that sin would follow from it? And what of free-will if one assumes the necessity of sinning, what of the justice of punishment if free will is removed? What of the justice of the reward, if
grace is the only factor that distinguishes some from others? Finally, if God is the ultimate reason for things, what do we ascribe to men, what to devils?

[A VI 3, p118]

PH - You overwhelm me with both the multitude and weight of the difficulties.
TH - Then let us proceed in a more precise way.3 Do you not accept, before all else, that nothing exists without a reason?

PH - I grant this to such a extent that I believe it can be demonstrated that nothing ever exists without it being possible (at least for one who is omniscient) to assign a sufficient reason why it exists rather
than not, and why it is thus rather than otherwise. Whoever denies this overturns the distinction between being itself, and non-being. Whatever exists will certainly have all the requisites for existing. But all the requisites for existing taken together are the sufficient reason for existing. Therefore whatever exists has a
sufficient reason for existing.

TH - I do not have anything to say against this demonstration, or rather against this opinion and, what is more, practice, of mankind. For all [Bel p32] men, when they experience something, especially if it is unfamiliar to them, ask why: that is, for the reason and either the
efficient cause or, if the author is rational, the final cause. From that cur [why] originated the words curae [concern] and curiositas [curiosity], just as quaerere [to ask] is from quis quaeve [who or what]. And when a reason has been given, if they have time for it, or it seems to be worth the effort, they seek the reason of the reason until
either as philosophers they come up with a clear reason which is necessary, i.e. is its own reason, or as ordinary people they come up with a reason which is common and already familiar to them, whereby they stop.

PH - It is entirely so, indeed, it is necessary that it is so, otherwise the foundations of sciences will be shattered. For just
as the whole is greater than the part is the first principle of Arithmetic and of Geometry, i.e. of the sciences of quantity, so nothing is without a reason is the foundation of physics and morals, sciences of quality, or what is the same (since quality is nothing other than power of acting and suffering) the sciences of action, thought and motion.
And you will acknowledge to me without risk that not even the smallest and easiest theorem of physics or morals can be demonstrated unless you assume this proposition: moreover the existence of God is dependant solely on it.

TH - Therefore you grant that nothing exists without
a reason?

PH - Why would I not grant that, even though I do not see where this painstaking confirmation of such a clear proposition is headed.

TH - Pay attention for a short while, you will see clearly enough what knotty chain of difficulties is bound up with it. Here, for
instance: Judas is damned.

PH - Who does not know that?

TH - Was it not on account of a reason?

PH - Please do not ask for what you know I granted a little while ago.

TH - So what is the reason?
PH - I think the state of he who was dying - namely the hatred of God which was burning in him when he died, in which consists the nature of despair. [A VI 3, p119] This [Bel p34] is sufficient for damnation however. For since the soul is not open4 to new external sensations from the moment of death until it is returned to the body, it perseveres5 only with
its last thoughts, from which it does not stray, but increases the state it was in at death. From the hatred of God, i.e. the happiest of beings, follows the greatest pain, for hatred is to feel pain at another's happiness (just as to love is to delight in the happiness of the beloved), therefore the greatest pain arises from hatred of the greatest
happiness. The greatest pain is misery or damnation. Thus he who hates God when dying damns himself.

TH - But from where in him does this hatred of God come, i.e. this wish or will to harm God?

PH - From nowhere except his belief of God's malevolence or hatred
towards him. For thus is established the wonderful secret of providence that God will only harm those who are slavishly afraid of him or presume that he is going to harm them,6 when conversely, whoever firmly believes that he is elected, or is dear to God, he (because he resolutely loves God) causes himself to be elected.7
TH - Why did he believe that God wills him harm?

PH - Because he knew he was rebellious, he believed God was a tyrant; because he knew he had fallen he believed God would not relieve him; because he knew he was guilty he believed God was unmerciful; because he knew he was wretched he believed
God was unjust.

TH - A quicker way to say it would have been to say that Judas was at the same time both penitent and desperate. But from where did this state of his soul originate?

PH - I see you [A VI 3, p120] are going to ask questions without end. He was penitent because of his
own conscience, desperate because of his ignorance of God: he knew he had sinned, so he believed God was going to punish him. He knew [Bel p36] he had sinned because God had endowed him with a mind and because it was true. He had sinned in betraying his Master because he had been willing and able to do so. His being able, God had allowed. He willed it
because he thought it good.

TH - But why did he think good what was evil? Likewise, why did he despair at the discovery of his error?

PH - Here we must return to the cause of his belief, for even despair is a belief. Every belief has two causes: the temperament of the believer and the
disposition of the object. I have not included another pre-existing belief because primitive beliefs are finally resolved into the object and the disposition of the soul and the temperament of the body, i.e. into the state of the person and the circumstances of the matter. Therefore the precise reason for Judas' false belief cannot be
given unless each state of his mind, which is altered by objects, has been explained all the way back to its initial temperament at birth.

TH - Here I've caught you. Sin comes from power and the will. Power comes from God, the will from belief. The belief is from the temperament and also the object. Both come from God,
therefore all the requisites of sin come from God, therefore the ultimate reason of sin and damnation (as well as of all other things) is God.8 You see what follows from the theorem that nothing is without a reason? Evidently, as you have said, all things which are not themselves the reason why they exist, such as sin and even damnation, must be
reduced to a reason, and the reason of the reason, until they are reduced to that which is the reason of itself, i.e. Being from itself, or God. This reasoning coincides with the demonstration of the existence of God.

PH - I acknowledge the difficulty. I shall collect myself for a little while
and catch my breath.

TH - Come now. Have you finally found something, my friend? Your suddenly stretched brow promises something lively and exciting.

[Bel p38]

PH - Pardon the pause, it was not unproductive. For if I have realized anything
certain from the experience of this day, it is that if someone turns to God, or [A VI 3, p121] what is the same, withdraws from the senses and leads his mind back into itself, and if he attempts to reach the truth with a genuine passion, the darkness is divided as if hit with a beam of unexpected light, and through the dense fog in the middle of the night the
way is revealed.

TH - These are the words of one who has attained this.

PH - You, then, shall be the judge of what I shall produce. I cannot deny that God is the ultimate reason of things, and hence also of the acts of sin.

TH - If you grant this, you
grant everything.

PH - Not so much haste! No, I say, I cannot deny it because it is certain: if it is supposed that God is taken away then it must also be supposed that the whole series of things is taken away,9 even these creatures that have been or will be, the good and evil acts of creatures, and hence the sins in those
acts. And yet I deny that sins originate from the divine will.

TH - So by this you want to say that sins occur not because God wills them, but because he exists?

PH - You have hit the nail on the head. Of course, even if God is the reason of sins he is nevertheless not their author; and, if I
might be permitted to speak in the Scholastic way, the ultimate physical cause of sins (as of all creatures) is in God, but the moral cause is in the one who sins. I suppose by this they wanted to say that the substance of the act is from God but not its evilness, even if they were unable to explain how the evil does not follow from the act. They would have
said it more correctly like this: God contributes everything to sin except the will, and hence he does not sin. I think, therefore, that sins should not be ascribed to the divine will, but to the divine understanding or, which is the same thing, to those eternal ideas, or the nature of things, so that no one should imagine that there are two principles of
things, twin Gods hostile to one another, one being a principle of the good, the other of evil.

TH - You tell a wonderful story.

[Bel p40]

PH - However I shall make you acknowledge it to be true. I will give an example which will make my
language clear and credible. That three times three is nine - to what, I ask, do we think it is to be ascribed? Perhaps the divine will?10 That in a square the diagonal is incommensurable with the side - shall we say that God [A VI 3, p122] decreed it?

TH - I suppose not, if we have understanding, for
otherwise neither nine and three, nor square or side or diagonal could be understood. Indeed they would be names without a thing, just as if someone were to say blitiri or vizlipuzli.

PH - Therefore these theorems are to be attributed to the nature of things, namely to the idea of nine or the idea of
square, and to the divine understanding in which the ideas of things have always subsisted from eternity. That is, God has not brought these theorems about by willing but by understanding: he understood them because he exists. For if God were non-existent all things would simply be impossible, and the number nine and the square would follow the
common fate. You see, therefore, that God is the cause of something not by his will but by his own existence.

TH - I see. However, by which light can sins be comprehended? I await your answer, eager and wondering.

PH - You will realize that my digression to this point
was not in vain. For just as it is ascribed not to the will but to the existence of God that three times three is nine, so it is to be ascribed to the same that the ratio of three to nine is that of four to twelve. For every ratio, proportion, analogy and proportionality is not from the will but the nature of God, or, which is the same, they originate
are united, and the greatest harmony is when the greatest number of things are united, and they are disordered in appearance and restored by some unexpected and wonderful ratio to the highest consonance.

[Bel p42]

TH - Now at last I see where you are headed
Evidently sins happen and bring forth the universal harmony of things, distinguishing light by shadows. But the universal harmony is not from the will of God but his understanding or the idea, i.e. the nature of things. Therefore we should ascribe sins to the same thing; hence sins follow not from the will but the existence
of God.11

[A VI 3, p123]

PH - You have guessed it. For it is so established with things that if sins had been removed the entire series of things would have been very much different. If the series of things is taken away or changed then the ultimate reason of things, i.e. God, will also
be taken away and changed. For it is impossible that from the same reason, and the same sufficient and complete reason, such as is God with regard to the universe,12 there should be opposite consequences, i.e. that different things follow from the same thing. For if you add to the same, then you subtract the same, the same will arise. But what is reasoning other
than the addition and subtraction of concepts? If anyone hereafter should resist, the demonstration to overcome their obstinacy is at hand. For let God be 'A' and this series of things 'B'. Now if God is the sufficient reason of things, i.e. being from itself, and the first cause, this series of things will follow (the existence of God
assumed),13 otherwise God would not be the sufficient reason for it, and some other requisite, independent of God, would have to be added to bring it about that this series of things exists. From which it would follow that there would be more principles of things, according to the thinking of the Manichaeans, and either there would be more
gods, or God would not be the only being from itself and first cause (both of which I suppose to be false). Therefore [Bel p44] it must be established that if God is assumed then this series of things follows, and [A VI 3, p124] hence this proposition is true: if 'A' exists, then 'B' will also exist. Now it is well known from the logical rules of the hypothetical
syllogism that a conversion through contraposition holds good, and thence it can be inferred: if 'B' does not exist, 'A' will not exist. Therefore it will follow that if this series of things (which evidently includes sins) were taken away or changed then God would be taken away or changed, which was to be demonstrated. Therefore sins, included in
this whole series of things, are due to the very ideas of things, i.e. to the existence of God: with his existence assumed, sins are assumed; with the existence of God taken away, sins are taken away.

TH - I admit the demonstration is impregnable and cannot be attacked with reason by any mortal, any more than the
demonstration of the existence of God. But see whether it does not also follow that (a) all remaining good things, as with sins, are not to be ascribed to God's will but to his nature, or, what comes down to the same thing, to the harmony of things, and (b) that sins are necessary.

PH - I shall focus on
answering the former objection so that, afterwards, the latter is easier to tackle. Why God wills things, then - I say it is not his will that is the cause of it (no-one in fact wills because they will, but because he thinks that the thing is merited), but the nature of the things themselves, which are evidently contained in the ideas themselves i.e.
within the essence of God. But why does God create things? There are two causes (as there always are in the actions of other minds too): because he wills it, of course, and because he is able to. But sins are not among the things that God either wills or produces because, evidently, when considered one by one, i.e. in themselves, he does not
find them good. But sins exist as a result of what God wills and produces, for he recognizes that they intervene in the best total harmony of things, chosen by him as a consequence, and because in the total series of harmony their existence is balanced against greater goods. Therefore he tolerates or even permits them, but he would exclude them if it
were absolutely possible to do so, i.e. if he could have chosen another, better, series of things without them. However it must be said that the whole series is not permitted but willed, and sins too insofar as they are not considered separately but [Bel p46] diffused throughout the whole series. For the universal harmony, the existence
alone of which delights God absolutely, is not of the parts, but of the whole series; everything else, except sins, also delights God through the parts considered in themselves. Still, would he therefore not be more delighted by the universal series if sins were absent? On the contrary, less; because that very harmony of the whole is rendered
delightful by the interposed dissonances, and balanced by a wonderful ratio.

[A VI 3, p125]

TH - Your thought pleases me greatly, by which you show in a satisfactory way that God should be called the reason for all existence, but not the author except of those
things which are considered to be good in themselves. However now see, to return to the second objection, whether it follows that sins are necessary. For since the existence of God is necessary and sins are a consequence of God's existence, i.e. of the ideas of things, sins will be necessary also. For whatever follows from
something necessary, is necessary.

PH - You should infer from the same argument that everything is necessary, even that I am speaking and you listening, for these things are also included in the series of things, and hence contingency is removed from the nature of things. This is contrary to the custom of speaking
accepted by the whole human race.

TH - But what if some Stoic, a patron of fatality, concedes this to you?

PH - It must not be conceded for it is contrary to the use of words, though those used in the explanation can be softened into the sense in which
even Christ has said 'It must be, i.e. it is necessary, that inducements to sin come to pass.'14 But inducements to sin are certainly sins. For woe to him, as he continues, through whom they come to pass. Therefore if inducements to sin are necessary so also is woe, i.e. damnation will be necessary. But in ordinary speech these consequences
have to be avoided. For it is not in accordance with our choice that the use of words in matters pertaining to life be distorted, lest hard and offensive consequences follow upon hearing them, which may disturb men unfamiliar with the less accepted meanings.

TH - But how will you answer this objection?
[Bel p48]

PH - How? Merely by showing that the entire difficulty arises from a distorted sense of words. From this source comes a labyrinth from which there is no return, which is a disaster in our field. The languages of all peoples have, through a kind of universal sophism, distorted the
terms 'necessity', 'possibility', and also 'impossibility', 'will', 'author' and others of that kind, into various senses. So that this does not cause you to think or say that I am turning my back on a challenge, I shall give clear proof: omit only those words in this entire discussion (for I believe that if they were prohibited by edict, men
could still express the thought of their minds without them) and, as often as needed, substitute them with their meanings, i.e. the definitions, and I shall contend, by wagering whatever you want, that immediately, as if by some exorcism and as if a torch were moved forward, all darkness will vanish and all spectres and phantoms of the difficulty will
vanish into thin air. Behold, you have a secret not so common - a remedy for all errors, abuses and scandals, of a sort neither Valerius Cordus, nor Zwelfer, nor any other author of dispensatory works could have prescribed you. Urbanus Regius once wrote about the formulas for speaking carefully. Therefore almost all the precepts of this art are
contained in this single ingenious device.

TH - [A VI 3, p126] Can such a matter be finished off with so little difficulty?

PH - Think of me as a prophet. There are often words which trouble, torment, hurt, provoke or aggravate us. If I should say to you: 'Sir, you
assert something knowing it to be harmful to me, which you know to be otherwise', I suppose you would not resent this greatly but instead you would easily pass over the liberty of the speaker. But if I were to exclaim 'You are lying!' (although to lie is nothing other than knowing you have falsely said something harmful or unjust), immortal God, how you would
raise a storm! Thus if someone were to say that sins are necessary, God is the cause of sin, God wills the damnation of some, it was impossible for Judas to be saved etc., doubtless he would disturb the Acheron; you would substitute with this: 'Since God is the ultimate reason of things, i.e. the sufficient reason of the universe, it follows that the reason for the
universe is the most rational, which is consistent with supreme beauty, i.e. the universal harmony (for all universal harmony is supreme). [Bel p50] But the most exquisite harmony is where the most confused disorder is unexpectedly brought back to order, just as a painting is distinguished by shades; harmony balances the different dissonances
into consonance (just as from two odd numbers an even number is made), sins themselves (which is noteworthy) impose their own punishment. The consequence is that, assuming God exists, sins and the punishment of sins also exist.15 But if by this it is said that this is necessary, that God willed it, that God becomes the author of it, it would
be thoughtless, foolish and wrong on behalf of the one who says it and the one who hears and understands.'

TH - You have surely brought to light a wonderful secret of avoiding so many difficulties, and there is no reason to compel you to go further. Nevertheless, if it is possible, could you prove with the words
you have eliminated that which you have proved with the words you have retained?

PH - I could prove this, if it were in my power to make men use words in no other way than for the honour of God and their own peaceful interests.

TH - But attempt it
nevertheless.

PH - I shall try, but only on condition that everything I shall say about those words (which, as I have shown and explained, we can abstain from entirely) is considered as if this matter were settled instead of as superfluous and insufficiently binding or
deceptive.

TH - I accept the condition.

PH - Therefore I shall call necessary that whose opposite implies contradiction, i.e. that which cannot be clearly understood. So it is necessary that three times three is nine, but it is not necessary for me to
speak or to sin.16 For I can be understood to be myself and yet understood not to be speaking, but three times [A VI 3, p127] three which is not understood to be nine is to understand three times three which is not three times three, which implies contradiction, as the calculation shows (i.e. the reduction of both terms in [Bel p52] the definition to
unities). Contingent things are those which are not necessary. Possible are those whose non-existence is not necessary. Impossible is that which is not possible, or, more briefly, possible is that which is able to be understood, i.e. (so that the expression 'is able' may not be placed in the definition of 'possible') that which is clearly
understood by an attentive person. Impossible is that which is not possible. Necessary, whose opposite is impossible. Contingent, whose opposite is possible. To will is to be delighted with the existence of something.17 To not-will is to feel pain about the existence of something, or to be delighted about the non-existence of something. To permit is neither to
will nor not-will something and yet to know it. To be the author is, by one's own will, to be the reason of another thing. With these definitions thus laid down, I am prepared to assert that no tortured consequences, which are anything less than honourable to the divine justice, can be wrenched out.
TH - What, then, will you say to that argument proposed before: the existence of God is necessary; sins included in the series of things follow from this; anything that follows from something necessary is necessary. Therefore sins are necessary.

PH - I answer: it is false that whatever follows from
something necessary in itself is necessary in itself. Certainly it is agreed that nothing follows from truths except truth. Nevertheless, since a particular can follow from pure universals, as in Darapti and Felapton, why should something contingent, i.e. necessary according to another hypothesis, not follow from something necessary in
itself? [A VI 3, p128] However, from this notion 'necessary in itself' I shall now finish off my investigation. For I have defined necessary as that whose opposite cannot be understood. Therefore the necessity and impossibility of things should be sought not outside the things themselves but in their own ideas, and we should see whether they can be
understood or whether they imply a contradiction instead. In fact, from this point, we only call necessary what is necessary in itself, that which evidently has the reason for its existence and its truth within itself, such as the truths of geometry. Of existing things, only God has this, everything else which follows from this supposed series of
things (i.e. from the harmony of things, [Bel p54] or the existence of God) is in itself contingent and is only necessary by the hypothesis, though nothing happens by chance since all things are fated; i.e. they follow as certain by a reason of providence. Therefore, if the essence of a thing can be conceived as clear and distinct (for
example, a species of animal with an odd number of feet, likewise an immortal animal) then it must already be considered possible, and its contrary will not be necessary although, perhaps, it is opposed to the existing harmony of things and to the existence of God, and consequently it will never have a place in the world but will be impossible by
accident. And therefore it is an error on the part of those who proclaim as impossible (absolutely, i.e. in itself) whatever has not been, is not and will not be.

TH - But in truth: is it not that whatever will be, will be absolutely necessary, just as whatever was, necessarily was? And at any rate, is it not the
case that whatever is, necessarily is?

PH - On the contrary it is false, unless it is understood to be reduplicative, and to contain an ellipsis, which is something familiar to men who dislike having to say the same thing twice. For the sense of what you have said is: whatever exists, it is necessary
that if it exists then it exists, or (necessary substituted by its definition) whatever is going to exist, it cannot be understood that if it is going to exist then it is not going to exist. If the reduplication is omitted, the proposition is false. For what is going to exist nevertheless can be understood as something that is not going to exist.
Also, what was not can nevertheless be understood to have been. This very thing is a mark of an elegant poet - to devise something false yet possible. Barclay's Argenis is possible,18 i.e. it is clearly and distinctly imaginable although it is certain that she has never been alive, and I do not believe that she will ever be alive, unless someone is